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John McIntyre and History
George Newlands
For those of us who had the privilege of being his students, Professor 
John McIntyre shed much light on the relationship between 
Christianity and history, and on many other things besides. I think 
of the light he shed as rather like the light of a prism, which opened 
up the unexpected, and sometimes highlighted the strangeness of the 
familiar. You might not always notice the light. It was not that sort of 
light. It neither dazzled nor scorched. It was not the sort of light which 
blinded you and then lurched on to stab at some other random object. 
It was not that sort of light at all. The best way to illustrate this is to 
look at John’s writing itself, and I want to introduce to you an essay 
which he offered for the Alec Cheyne Festschrift and which was not 
published there, because it did not quite fit in with the Scottish Church 
History theme of that volume.
The essay is “The Uses of History in Theology”.1 John begins with 
an elegant and substantial tribute to Alec Cheyne, and then turns to 
the question of a ‘special relationship’ between history and theology. 
Special relationships have a habit of imploding at inconvenient 
moments he reminds us, but then immediately quotes Pannenberg (the 
more thoughtful Pannenberg): ‘History is the most comprehensive 
horizon of Christian theology’. He opens up the subject of ‘the 
historical revolution, from Gatterer and Schlosser in Germany to Bury 
and Butterfield’. He traces the development of a new historiographical 
self-awareness, for example in Collingwood (and indeed Gary 
Badcock, in his superb study of McIntyre, tells us that he nearly started 
an Oxford DPhil on the uses of history in Collingwood). 
Authorities, sources and interpolations become issues. Science and 
history collide. Bultmann is a question but not an answer. Philosophers 
spin new global patterns out of the fragments. The problems of 
historical positivism remain.
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John McIntyre narrows the focus to the biographical uses of history. 
The spectre of the Historical Jesus, built on a highly selective view 
of history, stalks the nineteenth century and haunts us still. But 
deconstruction has to have some limits: ‘There has to be the “historical” 
if we are to make a process of “dehistoricising” feasible at all.’ One 
response to the fragmentation was Cullmann: ‘The essence of Christian 
Theology is Biblical History’ – but this brings new difficulties. In the 
face of these John reiterates politely what he used to say in his lectures 
long ago: this Heilsgeschichte has more Heil than Geschichte.
We now come to the section “The Critical-Destructive Use of History”: 
here he puts his cards firmly on the table – face up. The logical structure 
of arguments about what could not possibly happen or be true is often 
unstable – miracles can become too speedily unthinkable. The starting 
point of a Christology from below need not also become the finishing 
point – destructive criticism is not enough.
Then we hit a note often heard in John’s work: too often theologians 
rush to fall on their swords too soon. Kierkegaard embraced theological 
scepticism for the sake of pure faith. But this was a step too far: the 
minimal Christian core can’t be salvaged by the subjective act of 
faith. 
The denouement of this drama comes in the shape of “Further Examples 
of the History Connection in Theology”. If pure subjectivity won’t get 
us there, artificial objectivity won’t do either. 
It is fascinating to compare this essay with The Christian Doctrine of 
History,2 published forty years earlier in 1957, and based on lectures 
at Union Theological Seminary in 1953. In eight chapters history is 
related to doctrine, definition, necessity, providence, the incarnation 
(three chapters in all), freedom, memory and structures. Here as 
in the Cheyne essay, incarnation is THE central clue to a Christian 
understanding of history. There are the trademark sub-divisions and 
precise teasing out of meanings. History is clearly interpreted in 
relation to providence and providence is seen in the light of incarnation. 
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Incarnation is redemptive and recreative. It is creative, prospective 
and integrative – there is no talk of The Myth Of God Incarnate here! 
For McIntyre there are no easy answers or trendy fixes. Typical is this 
sentence:
While it must be said that the Christian doctrine of 
history “makes sense” of history, this statement requires 
the gravest qualifications. For at the same time it 
introduces profounder depths of meaninglessness into 
history than any other of the competing views …3
The death of Christ, as a consequence of our sins, underlines the 
mystery of the cross at the heart of the nature of the loving God. This 
is a robust theology with no concessions to the fashions of the times.
In his introduction to John McIntyre’s last book, Theology After the 
Storm,4 Gary Badcock perceptively says this of The Christian Doctrine 
of History: ‘One might, in fact, describe it as the most Barthian of all 
McIntyre’s books.’5
At the same time, it is no accident that much of Theology after the 
Storm is devoted to “The Humanity of Christ” and “Theology of 
Prayer”. The accent may have changed, but the substance in no way 
reflects the trendy modern professor of anything vaguely religious at 
the University of Barrow-in-Furness. At the centre of “The Humanity 
of Christ” is a telling section on ‘Humanity as Historicity’. Again. 
History and incarnation are indissolubly linked. He looks with 
disbelief at the retreat from history:
The flight from history – one might even call it a 
stampede – has taken a number of forms. … If the kind 
of meticulous analysis had been given to kerygma as was 
given to its running mate in that celebrated vaudeville 
act, Kerygma and Myth, then I feel that theology 
generally and New Testament theology in particular 
would have been considerably better served than it has 
been by the demythologisers over that period.6
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Even more emphatically:
In a sentence, the dehistoricization of the faith which 
is thought to be implied by existential theologies as 
critical theories is the docetism of the twentieth century, 
because by its scepticism it takes humanity out of the 
only milieu in which it can possibly exist, namely, 
historical process.7
For McIntyre, God is active in the world. Not through some shortcut 
of salvation history but through the dimension of prayer, God invites 
us to respond to his call in active discipleship:
It has to be said right from the start that a belief in the 
efficacy of prayer in relation to events in the world, 
in history and within persons and their relations to 
one another is an inalienable part of the Christian 
understanding of prayer.8
Here is a sign of God’s intervention in our world:
To deny that is both to invalidate the doctrine of creatio 
continua and to subscribe to the noninterfering God of 
Deism.9
And his own prayers memorably combine trust in God with realism 
about ourselves:
O God, the world in which we are called to live is not 
 one of black and white but of different grays;
not of truth and falsehood but the compounding of both;
not of good and evil but the ambiguities that divide  
 them;
not of light and darkness but the twilight between.
Give us, therefore, wisdom this day in our choices,
courage in our decisions,
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and a continual discontent with anything less than the  
 best that Thou hast revealed to us so wondrously in  
 Jesus Christ. Amen.10
In the final essay in Theology After the Storm, on “The Cliché as 
a Theological Medium”, John hammers away again at the easy 
accommodations of theologians to historical scepticism. He called 
for a new analytical philosophy of history. But such is the crooked 
history of thought that before the end of the century intellectuals were 
pronouncing the end of history. 
If we want to be quite precise about what John was saying about 
history towards the end of the twentieth century – and precision was 
important to John – we can turn to a highly significant piece which he 
produced in the Festschrift for James Barr in 1994. The piece is called 
“Historical Criticism in a ‘History-Centred Value System’”.11 Here he 
mounts an incisive critique of the ideas of history as homogeneous 
and of a uniform historical method ‘from Kierkegaard to Pannenberg’ 
as he puts it. This is partly inspired by James Barr’s own critique of 
‘the high value currently assigned to “history”.’ As James of blessed 
memory himself put it, ‘What I have called story is an absolutely 
essential and central aspect of the Old Testament; it cannot, however, 
be too simply identified, indeed it cannot be identified at all, with 
history.’12 
For John McIntyre in that essay, history is a field-encompassing field, 
involving geography, anthropology, philology and much more. So 
there is no single entity called “historical criticism”. John traces this 
back to his old subject Collingwood’s criticism of F. H. Bradley. He 
acknowledges debts to Stephen Toulmin and Van Harvey, but criticised 
Harvey for ultimately selling the pass, as it were, to history: 
I think it ought to be said that the theologian rejects a 
presupposition which Van Harvey never quite brings 
out into the open, namely that theological method is 
coterminous with historical method.13
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No more Mr Nice Guy, as far as the College of Humanities and Social 
Sciences is concerned. On the other hand, he concludes by asserting 
firmly that:
Rarely, if ever, do arguments present themselves in 
totally pure form, as either analytic or substantial. So, 
once again, we have to return to reliance upon the 
judgement of the theologian, who reaches his decision, 
not by some process of blind intuition, but through the 
assessment of the validity of the arguments which come 
to him out of the fields which constitute his theological 
field.14
There are no theological magic wands, pleas for exemptions to the 
rules, retreats behind the covered wagons. Theology is theology, 
strong enough to stand on its own feet and argue the issues out openly 
and freely among the other disciplines. 
The Christian Doctrine of History came out in 1957. Coincidentally, 
in the same year (and this is now half a century ago!) Pannenberg 
and a group of his friends published the collection of essays under 
the title Revelation as History. The theme of the Pannenberg circle 
was that, as they put it, kerygma without history is a meaningless 
noise. The preaching of the word of God is an empty assertion if it is 
severed from what really happened in history. John would have agreed 
heartily. Faith cannot live from a kerygma which is detached from its 
historical basis and content. For after all the kerygma is itself nothing 
but the declaration of what God has actually done in the course of the 
events of ordinary human history. The standard history of salvation 
theology has always foundered on a dualism between revelation and 
history. It fled from the historical flood tide into the harbour of a supra-
history. The theology of existence withdrew from objective history to 
the ‘historicality’ of the individual.
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But revelation comes not merely in or through history but AS 
history: 
1. The self-revelation of God has occurred indirectly through his 
historical acts. 
2. Revelation happens not at the beginning but at the end of history. 
3. Historical revelation is there for anyone who has eyes to see. It 
is universal in character (external clarity of scripture, I hear you 
cry). 
4. The universal revelation of the godhead of God was not yet realised 
in the history of Israel, but first in the destiny of Jesus of Nazareth, 
insofar as the end of history occurs beforehand in him. 
5. The Christ event does not reveal the godhead of the God of Israel 
as an isolated event, but only in so far as it is part of God’s history 
with Israel.
The accent on the universal historical scope of revelation is of course 
the big break from Barth and Bultmann. The totality of reality as 
history is not just the world, but God’s world, which he created and 
through which he reveals himself. Pannenberg would agree that he 
borrows much from Hegel – but Hegel was wrong in identifying his 
own philosophy with that end standpoint from which one could view 
the whole. The final revelation has taken place in the resurrection 
of Jesus from the dead. But what has happened to him still remains 
outstanding, unaccomplished, for us, and so history goes on and 
promises have yet to be fulfilled.
It is not possible to base the gospel on the Christ of faith. The Jesus 
of history himself must be the actual starting point of Christology. 
Even and precisely, a theology of the resurrection, must establish itself 
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squarely upon the earthly Jesus. The resurrection did not happen in 
a vacuum. Judaism already expected a resurrection from the dead. 
For those who already hoped, the resurrection would be a sign of the 
coming of the end of the world, a corroboration by God of Jesus’ claim 
to authority.
The key to history is apocalyptic. Here John would certainly have 
switched to watching the cricket on another channel.
Why the man Jesus can be the ultimate revelation of 
God, why in him and only in him God is supposed to 
have appeared, remains incomprehensible apart from 
the horizon of the apocalyptic expectation.15 
But how is primitive Christianity as a whole to be related to the present, 
if not through the Word? Pannenberg’s answer is framed in terms of 
a theology of universal history, which deals with what he calls the 
horizon of the historical process. The gap between past and present 
is bridged by the continuing history of God’s unfolding plan for the 
world. The Church and its tradition have a structural significance in a 
hermeneutic of universal history.
What then of the Protestant tradition of sola scriptura, the Bible alone? 
The subject matter of scripture, the person and history of Jesus Christ, 
can no longer be found in the external clarity of the text. We have 
to find a new understanding of the relation between past event and 
present faith by creating a new hermeneutical bridge. We can’t just 
call for obedience to the authority of the word of God. Cool! But alas, 
the ‘totality of history’ to which Pannenberg calls us may prove to be 
at least as elusive as the Word mythology which he rightly questions.
For Pannenberg, Israel came to understand itself in terms of its own 
history, and understood its God as a God who is active within that 
history. This understanding was reinforced by God’s revelation in 
Jesus, in whom the end of history has broken in anticipation.
 
page 27
History and hermeneutics become the magic wands. Unkind critics 
mutter the Marxist mantra that the theologian must be concerned 
not only to interpret but to transform the world and human history. 
Of course if you change it without first understanding it you end up 
– probably – in George Bush’s White House. Don’t just do something, 
stand there!
Everything turns into history. Pannenberg draws connections between 
contingency in physics and contingency in history. Sceptics might 
think there is no obvious link between a statistically indeterminate 
future and the eschatological future of God, and so Pannenberg’s 
‘fusion of horizons’ which should create universal historical meaning 
never quite happens. Nevertheless, Pannenberg’s criticism of the 
verbalisation of the gospel in much of the tradition, especially the 
Protestant tradition, may still be important.
Everything is served with history, like with Diet Coke and fries. Man 
is by nature an historical creature. The combination of events in a 
man’s life gives him his individuality, and drives him forward to seek 
a meaningful future. By looking at man in his historical environment 
we can see who he really is and we may come to see that this existence 
can only be fully realised in the light of Christ, the key to true humanity. 
Sceptics may complain that God’s prophetic word may cut across the 
development of human history, which occasionally leads to genocide. 
Now you may wonder why I have dwelt on Pannenberg at such 
inordinate length – and of course one has to respect the power and 
comprehensiveness of Pannenberg’s vision. What I want to bring out 
by contrast is the immense care and precision which characterises 
John’s work. He never wraps himself up comfortably in that woolly 
blanket of dogmatic complexification that the rest of us turn to when 
we feel the chill of rigorous intellectual scrutiny. You may say that 
this is a rather austere perspective on Christian faith. But it is always 
at least honest. This is what we can say. It may not be all we would 
love to claim but we can justify what we have set out. Is that all there 
is? It appears to be more than enough to undergird a generous and 
catholic vision of Christian community as empowered by prayer, by 
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worship and by discipleship. That is why we remember John today 
with gratitude and with fond remembrance. 
And if you think I’ve been a little unfair to Pannenberg – whoever 
said theology was meant to be fair? – I should perhaps add that he is 
the soul of clarity compared with more recent writers on history and 
events. I quote: 
The moment the real is identified as event, making way 
for the division of the subject, the figures of distinction 
in discourse are terminated, because the position of 
the real instituted by them is revealed, through the 
retroaction of the event, to be illusory … There is no 
doubt that universalism, and hence the existence of any 
truth whatsoever, requires the destitution of established 
differences and the initiation of a subject divided in itself 
by the challenge of having nothing but the vanished 
event to face up to.16
In reality, the Pauline break has a bearing upon the 
formal conditions and the inevitable consequences of a 
consciousness-in-truth rooted in a pure event, detached 
from every objectivist assignation to the particular laws 
of a world or society yet concretely destined to become 
inscribed within a world and within a society. What 
Paul must be given exclusive credit for establishing is 
that the fidelity to such an event exists only through the 
termination of communitarian particularisms and the 
determination of a subject-in-truth who indistinguishes 
the One and the “for all.”17 
Well exactly.
Whatever we may think about the destitution of established differences, 
John was dead right to stress that history can always come back to 
bite us. Take this month’s little sensation about finding the lost tomb 
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of Jesus. Here is a comment last week of some worth, of Professor 
Charlesworth, to be precise:
There is nothing that archaeology can provide that can 
be damaging to Christian faith. Archaeology cannot 
form faith; it can only inform faith.18
But I expect if archaeologists found an authentic diary from Jesus 
recounting a happy retirement in the Bahamas this might somewhat 
impinge on faith! History is important.
In the Preface to The Christian Doctrine of History John refers to the 
many conversations he had with Reinhold Niebuhr during his tenure 
of the Fulbright Fellowship in Union Theological Seminary, New 
York in 1953. What does it mean to be a Christian and to imagine 
Christian community? Niebuhr says this, using I think for the first 
time that expansive word ‘Christomorphic’ which was to be used later 
by so many theologians:
They know themselves to be Christian when they see 
their companions in need in the form of Christ; there 
echoes in their memory in such moments the story 
Christ told which ends in the well-known statement, 
“inasmuch as you have done it to one of the least of 
these my brethren you have done it unto me.” The 
symbol is not a mere figure of speech. Symbol and 
reality participate in each other. The needy companion 
is not wholly other than Christ, though he is not Christ 
himself. He is a Christo-morphic being, apprehended 
as in the form of Christ, something like Christ, though 
another.19
I think John would have had a lot of sympathy with these sentiments. 
Christians in community believe that in God’s purpose for humanity 
Jesus Christ plays an indispensable and decisive role. This is a pointer 
to a Christomorphic mystery. 
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All our theories are only pointers in the direction of the divine love. 
We participate in the life of God, but as pilgrims on the way to a 
mystery, a mystery which will reveal itself in all kinds of ways in the 
future. Christian truth is true, but it remains a suggestion. 
The norms of our theology will be determined by the kenotic shape 
which is the hallmark of Christian faith and the catalysing contribution 
to human dialogue about the most serious issues facing humanity. Such 
norms are sensitive to cultural and political marginality, to the dialogue 
of world religions, to humanist projects of various sorts. But they are 
not infinitely inclusive. Faith remains decisively opposed to evil in all 
its forms. This paradigm sets priorities as always related to those at 
the greatest point of need – especially in a political context in which 
there is often a huge gulf between appearance and reality. It is through 
a conception of divine action, through a sense of the divine love in 
history, social, political and personal, that theology comes to speak 
most readily of God. For Christian faith, the Christomorphic paradigm 
is the icon of God’s unconditional generosity – both self-subsisting 
and self-relating. How this is so remains the divine mystery. 
 
The omnipresence of luck, good and bad, and random evil, raises a 
question mark about all this. We become aware that faith is sometimes 
effective despite the appearance of things. Most of the time we see 
fragments, sometimes hardly a trace, of a Christomorphic element 
in the complexities of society. Yet it is the Christian vision which 
‘traces the rainbow through the rain’ and may provide an antidote to 
indifference. This is a trace which we may recognise in other religions 
and in humanist action, wherever we recognise the lineaments of the 
signature of the divine love. These lineaments are more likely to be 
found in coordinated instances of attention to grinding poverty than in 
sentimental reflection. 
Looking back to 1995 – now light years away – and the 150th 
Anniversary Disruption to Diversity volume,20 I see that I wrote of one 
of his books, “As often, a cool sense of humour is just about allowed 
to emerge, in the entitling of a chapter, ‘Universalisers, Relaters and 
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Contemporanisers’, and the work ends with a focus on forgiveness.” 
I went on to note that:
McIntyre followed John Baillie in combining appre-
ciation of the constructive content of Barth’s theology 
with scepticism about the doctrine of revelation which 
was integral to his theological programme. He reinforced 
the influence of the liberal evangelical tradition, and 
though not especially liberal by contemporary standards 
was widely held to represent the best of the broad church 
inheritance in Scotland.21
And I ended with the testimony that:
Those who had the privilege of sitting under Torrance 
and McIntyre had the benefit of a uniquely valuable 
double perspective in systematic theology.22
Looking at the world of systematic theology in 2007, and with the 
distinguished exception of the current incumbent of John’s chair, this 
is even more apposite now than it was then. It is truly meet, right and 
our bounden duty that we should now praise famous men, and not 
least John McIntyre.
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